“Extended Premises” Can Extend Farther Than Employers Realize

April 19, 2010

In American Trucking Association v. Stallings, issued on Feb. 23, 2010, the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Commission finding that an employee who is injured outside of an employer’s office building on her way in to work is eligible for compensation under the “extended premises” doctrine.

Stallings involved an employee who was injured from a slip on an icy sidewalk while returning to work from her lunch break. The fall occurred in an area that was not controlled or owned by her employer, but which an employee was necessarily required to traverse in order to reach the office space. Because the Court found that the employee was returning to her place of employment and was crossing an area she was rightfully allowed to pass through, the injury occurred on the employer’s extended premises.

An injury incurred while going to or from work is generally not compensable under Virginia’s Workers’ Compensation Act. However, there is an important exception to this rule under the “extended premises” doctrine. This means that if an employee is injured in a common area of her place of employment, such as “common stairs, elevators, lobbies, vestibules, concourses, hallways, walkways, ramps, footbridges, driveways, or passageways,” the injury does fall under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Whether or not the employer owns or maintains the portion of its extended premises where the accident occurred is irrelevant, so long as the employee as a right of passage over the area, or in the Court’s words, “something equivalent to an easement.”

In determining whether the extended premises doctrine covers a given location, courts look at whether the area is “in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employers’ premises.” Courts probably will find this standard to be satisfied where the area constitutes “an essential means of ingress and egress from the public right-of-way to [the employer's] place of business.”

While the most common scenario involves employees injured in the common areas of an office building which is owned and operated by a third party, there is no requirement that the injury occur on private premises for the employee to be eligible for workers’ compensation. Even if the slip-and-fall occurs on a public sidewalk outside of the office building’s entrance, if the employee was required to cross that portion of the sidewalk in order to access the building, the accident is likely to be covered.

The take-home message for employers: If an employee has no choice but to cross an area in order to reach your office, it doesn’t matter whether you own it or control it. That section is a part of your employment premises for purposes of Workers’ Compensation.


Employee Misconduct Does Not Including Failing to Agree to Unreasonable Employer Policies

March 25, 2010

With at-will employment, employers are within their rights to fire employees who fail to agree to company policies. This is true regardless of whether those policies are reasonable or unreasonable. The Virginia Court of Appeals recently decided, however, that although an employer may choose to terminate an employee who is unwilling to agree to an unreasonable policy, the employee’s refusal will not constitute “misconduct” so as to bar a claim for unemployment benefits.

In Williamson v. VEC (March 23, 2010), Plaintiff Williamson refused to sign his employers’ company vehicle policy. The policy went far beyond what a standard company vehicle policy might require, and contained a clause stipulating that employees would be bound by any company policies “that might be enacted in the future.”

Instead of agreeing to the policy as written, Williamson proposed his own policy to the employer, which was substantially similar in form and content, but clarified some of the parameters of when liability would be assigned, and removed the “future enacted policies” clause. His employer then promptly fired him, stating it was less due to any objections to the proposed policy and more to the fact that Williamson had thought he was entitled to write company policy himself. Williamson then tried to claim unemployment benefits, and the case was appealed up to the Court of Appeals.

Under Va. Code § 60.2-618(2)(a), unemployment benefits are not available to an employee who has lost their position “if the [Virginia Employment] Commission finds such individual is unemployed because he has been discharged for misconduct connected with his work.” Although purposeful violation of a company rule that is “reasonably designed to protect the [employer's] legitimate business interests” constitutes misconduct, the Court of Appeals found in this case that the policy the employer had instituted “far exceeded [the] employer’s interest in the operation of its vehicles.” It was therefore not a reasonable means of promoting any legitimate business interest, and it was not tantamount to misconduct to refuse to sign it.

As the Court stated, “The proposed policy further binds all employees to ‘any policies now in place or that might be enacted in the future.’ … One who agrees to abide by an undisclosed future policy as a condition of continued employment would be foolhardy.” Of course, the employer had not acted improperly by asking the employee to sign the foolhardy agreement, nor by firing the employee when he declined to do so; the employer simply could not claim that the termination had been for misconduct.


New Opinion: Employee Eligible For Workers’ Compensation After Being Struck By Car

November 10, 2009

July 19, 2006 was a bad day for Betsy Loveless.  As she was performing her job duties at a nursery garden shop, shutting off sprinklers that abutted Route 17 in Gloucester County, she heard the screeching of tires and looked up to see a vehicle “flying off” the highway in her direction.  She made a run for some trees to dodge the oncoming car, but had to also get around some slippery weed mats and potted plants that were in her way.  Poor Betsy was but a foot from a protective tree when the car hit her, causing injuries.  She thereupon made a claim for workers’ compensation, and the Commission ruled that since the injury “arose out of the course of her employment,” she was eligible.  The employer, who was probably wondering how a random out-of-control car accident could be considered part of her employment as a nursery employee, appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals.

The Court, in Green Hand Nursery, Inc., et al. v. Loveless, affirmed the Commission’s determination.  Judge Robert P. Frank, on behalf of a unanimous panel, reaffirmed that Virginia courts use the “actual risk” test to determine whether an injury “arises out of” the employment.  That test holds that “if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises ‘out of’ the employment.”  Surely it could not be argued that it was a natural incident of working at a nursery that cars would jump off the road to hit the employees, or that reasonable people would assume that would happen, right?

But as the Court explains, we’re looking at the wrong thing.  The car isn’t the focus of the inquiry — it’s the slippery weed mats and potted plants that are.  If not for those obstructions, which were all clearly work-related, our friend Betsy would have made it to the trees and perhaps escaped injury.  In other words, the fact that a nursery employee works around items that make it difficult for the employee to evade incoming harm shows that any injury thereafter suffered as a result of having to dodge those items is work-related, and thus subject to workers’ compensation.

Perhaps the most important caveat of this published opinion came in the first sentence of the second paragraph: “On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party before the commission.”  Given that edge, the Court was pretty well obligated to believe that Betsy would have been fine (although a little shaken) if she had a fraction of a second more to get behind a tree.  That may have made the biggest difference in the outcome of this case.


Workers’ Compensation Commission May Change Rule On Suspension Of Benefits

October 19, 2009

Another article in this week’s Virginia Lawyers Weekly reports on how the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission is currently considering reversing the way it has handled termination of benefits for injured workers for several decades.  Specifically, it has been customary practice that when an injured worker returns to work, the employer would file a request with the Commission for a ruling on whether the employer could terminate payment of benefits, and while that request was pending the Commission would allow the employer to suspend those payments pending the ruling.  If the Commission ultimately ruled for the employee, the employer had to pay the with-held benefits plus interest — but that might not be for a year while the Commission considered the request.  In the meantime the employee went without benefits, and could have suffered adversely as a result of the reduced income.

The article details how one workers’ compensation lawyer, Peter Sweeny, devised a way of getting around that practice on behalf of his employee clients: he’d obtain a certified copy of the original award and docket it in the local circuit court as a judgment against the employer, and then institute collections proceedings against the employer to recover the suspended benefits.  Three cases in which he did this are currently being considered by the Commission. 

Naturally, employers would rather that the Commission continue the practice of regularly suspending benefits payments and put an end to Sweeny’s way of dodging the suspension.  Employers also have the realistic concern that if the Commission rules for the employer and determines that the employee was not entitled to benefits the employer had been paying out during the review process, there will be little likelihood of the employer ever seeing that money again.  But the case raises interesting due process concerns for employees.  So the odds appear to be that the Commission will decide to determine future suspensions on a case-by-case basis instead of always allowing employers to suspend payments.


New Opinion: Respondeat Superior Liability To Be Determined By Jury

October 1, 2009

In Rivett Group, LLC, et al. v. Chelda, Inc., et al., the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia in Danville denied summary judgment to an employer (Ham’s Restaurants) whose employee (Byers) was involved in a fire that damaged a Super 8 the employee was staying at (on the employer’s dime) while receiving management training.  The issue was whether Ham’s could be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior (basically, the rule that employers are liable for the actions of their employees while acting in the scope of their employment) for Byers’s actions in potentially starting the fire.

Here, Senior Judge Jackson L. Kiser ruled that the facts presented were not sufficient to hold as a matter of law that Ham’s faced no liability, and thus the issue had to go to a jury.  First, the court noted that since Virginia courts had not squarely addressed whether respondeat superior applied when an employee was staying at a hotel under the employer’s direction, the court followed the reasoning of Gina Chin & Assocs. v. First Union Bank, 260 Va. 533, 537 S.E.2d 573 (2000) to find that the employee’s intent was not a factor.  In Virginia, the existence of an employer-employee relationship created a prima facie rebuttable presumption of the employer’s liability for the employee’s actions, so the burden was on the employer to show facts indicating that the employee was acting outside of the employment relationship at the time of the incident.  The court then reasoned that there must be “a slight deviation or a marked and unusual departure from the employer’s business” before summary judgment on this issue was appropriate.  Since Byers was at the Super 8 on the employer’s insistence, he had management materials to review while not on the job site, and Ham’s offered to pay his medical bills after the fire, the court ruled that the issue was properly determined by a jury instead of on summary judgment even though it could be argued that Byers’s act of smoking (which was alleged to have started the fire) in itself was not an act within the scope of employment.

The court did grant summary judgment to the parent company of Ham’s (Chelda, Inc.), however, since the petitioners had not alleged any actions by Chelda that would create an employer-employee relationship with Byers aside from owning Ham’s and being on Byers’s Super 8 bill.

The court mentioned another Virginia case, Southern Motor Lines v. Alvis, 200 Va. 168, 104 S.E.2d 735 (1958), where a trucker staying at a hotel at his employer’s direction died, and his estate thereupon sued the employer for workers’ compensation.  There, the Court held that the employee was “engaged in and about his master’s business” at the time of his death while staying at the hotel, and thus the estate could recover under the Act.  However, “the test for determining whether an accidental injury ‘[arose] out of and in the course of employment,’ within the meaning of [Virginia's workers' compensation act], is not the same as the test for determining whether a servant acted within the scope of his employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”  Sayles v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 242 Va. 328, 331, 410 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1991).  Confused?  Join the club.  Employers that want to make sure that they are not on the hook for any damages that employees cause while traveling may want to consider policies governing when an employee is “on duty” and “off duty,” and may want to consider allowing the employee choose where they stay (giving them an allowance instead) while traveling.  Since Virginia law is not settled here, employers are mostly guessing at this point.  Employers with specific questions should contact Jessica M. Kelty.


New Opinion: Volunteer’s Injury Recoverable Under Gross Negligence

September 29, 2009

In Harris v. Norfolk Botanical Garden Society, the Norfolk Circuit Court held that a volunteer weed-puller who was injured while at the Norfolk Botanical Garden could maintain a claim for gross negligence against the charitable group for injuries suffered at the Garden. 

The Garden was clearly a charitable institution, and accordingly requested a special plea for charitable immunity against Harris’s claims.  But under the principles set forth in Ola v. YMCA of South Hampton Roads, 270 Va. 550 (2005), the charitable immunity doctrine only applies to beneficiaries of the charity.  In this case, a beneficiary would be someone who was touring the Garden or participating in a lecture.  Here, however, Harris had volunteered to pull weeds at the Garden.  Judge John R. Doyle, III accordingly held that Harris was an invitee at the time she was injured, not a beneficiary, and thus the Garden was not entitled to immunity.

The Garden next argued that since Harris was directed how to perform her work and was given compensation in the form of access to local museums and letters of recommendation, she was thus covered under the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act and could only pursue her remedies therein, pursuant to the exclusivity provision in Va. Code § 65.2-307.  The Act does not apply to noncompensated employees of charitable organizations.  The Court found that Harris was an employee, but that the benefits given by the Garden did not count as compensation since “her decision to work pulling weeds on the day of her injury was purely gratuitous,” and there was no evidence that Harris used or valued any of the benefits given by the Garden.  Thus, Harris was not forced to abandon her claim for gross negligence against the Garden, which allows greater potential compensation than a claim under the Act.


Employers May Be On The Hook For Weight-Reduction Surgery For Obese Employees Injured On The Job

September 16, 2009

A new article in the National Law Journal warns employers that obese employees injured on the job may be able to include as part of their workers’ compensation the cost of any weight-reduction surgery necessary to enable the employee to receive treatment for the work-related injury.  In two recent cases, one in Indiana and one in Oregon, trial courts awarded obese workers the costs of that surgery as part of their recovery under state workers’ compensation laws.  As Rick Gikas, lawyer for the successful Indiana plaintiff, stated, “It definitely confirms that longstanding rule that you take your employees as you find them.”

Although this issue does not appear to have cropped up yet in Virginia courts, Virginia employers should take notice of this potential trend.


New Opinion: Injury From Stepping Up Into A Truck Not Eligible For Workers’ Compensation

August 19, 2009

In Haley v. Springs Global U.S., Inc., the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed a denial of workers compensation to a switcher operator who suffered a rupture to his distal quadriceps tendon when he attempted to negotiate the approximately 16-inch step up into the truck cab where he was to perform his duties.  Under Va. Code § 65.2-101, a compensable injury must occur “by [an] accident arising out of and in the course of the employment” in order to be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Here, Judge Randolph A. Beales, on behalf of the three-judge panel, reasoned that while the injury surely occurred in the course of Haley’s employment, it did not also arise out of that employment.  In order to arise from the employment, the injury must be the result of a “causative hazard of the employment.”  If the step had been defective in some way, even “just a little bit higher than usual,” then the injury would have arisen from the employment and been compensable.  But what is “usual” depends on the case — the usual step into the cab of a truck may be different than the usual staircase step, for example.  In this case, the step Haley was injured on was not shown to have been defective in any way, his claim for workers’ compensation was denied.


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